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Abstract
This study develops a “comply or explain” index which captures compliance
and quality of explanations given for non-compliance with the corporate
governance codes in UK and Germany. In particular, we explain, how com-
pliance and quality of explanations provided in non-compliance disclo-
sures, and various other internal corporate governance mechanisms, affect
the market valuation of firms in the two countries. A dynamic generalised
method of moments (GMM) estimator is employed as the research tech-
nique for our analysis, which enabled us to control for the potential effects
of endogeneity in our models. The findings of our content analysis suggest
that firms exhibit significant differences in compliance, board indepen-
dence and ownership structure in both countries. The “comply or explain”
index is positively associated with the market valuation of UK firms
suggesting that compliance and quality governance disclosure are value rel-
evant in the UK. Institutional blockholders' ownership is, however, nega-
tively associated with the market value of firms, which raises questions
about the monitoring role of institutional shareholders in both countries.
We argue that both compliance and explanations given for non-compliance
are equally important, as long as valid reasons and justifications for non-
compliance are provided by the reporting companies. These findings thus
imply that the “comply or explain” principle is working well and that UK
and German companies could benefit from the flexibility offered by this
principle. With respect to the role of board size, board independence, own-
ership structure, and institutional ownership of firms, this study offers pol-
icy implications.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the 2007–2009 global financial crisis
corporate governance regulation has received consider-
able attention. The severe economic and social impact of
the crisis and related corporate scandals resulted in major
changes in the governance structure and regulations in
most countries around the world. For instance, the
Walker (2009) review of corporate governance mecha-
nisms in the UK and the Dodd–Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010) in the US
recommended substantial changes to the corporate
governance mechanisms of financial firms. Since the
2007–2009 financial crisis was attributed to the weak
corporate governance practices at major financial insti-
tutions (Kirkpatrick, 2009; Conyon et al., 2011), the
associated reviews specifically focused on financial
firms. This highlights the perceived importance of
firm-level corporate governance mechanisms for
organisational performance and protecting the inter-
ests of stakeholders.
A considerable amount of literature has therefore
examined the impact of corporate governance mecha-
nisms on firm performance. For example, Ntim, Lindop,
and Thomas (2013) suggest that improving risk reporting
as well as risk management practices produces positive
effects on the quality of risk disclosure/management
practices in South African companies. Similarly, Tan and
Liu (2016) document that, as compared to several other
factors, governance structure variables can better explain
the long-term idiosyncratic volatility of Australian firms.
Furthermore, Farag and Mallin (2017) report that board
diversity reduces banks' vulnerability to the effects of fini-
cal crisis in Europe. Therefore, in relation to a firm's
operations and long-term success all these findings pin-
point the important role of corporate governance mecha-
nisms in different countries.
Although conceptually and theoretically the link
between corporate governance and performance is clear,
the overall findings of existing governance-performance
literature are inconclusive. As such there are studies
which report a strong positive relationship (see for exam-
ple, Durnev & Kim, 2005; Klapper & Love, 2004), while
others document a negative relationship (see for example,
Bauer, Guenster, & Otten, 2004); or no relationship (see
for example, Schultz, Tan, & Walsh, 2010; Wintoki,
Linck, & Netter, 2012) between corporate governance
and firms' performance. In the context of the 2007–2009
financial crisis, a recent study by Gupta, Krishnamurti,
and Tourani-Rad (2013) document that well-governed
companies do not necessarily out-perform poorly
governed companies. However, an emerging stream of
research in this area argues that the majority of the
index-based studies have focused only on the compliance
aspect of “comply or explain” codes. As the governance
systems based on the 'comply or explain' principle have
two important elements, “comply” and “explain”,
emphasising on just one aspect that is, compliance is not
sufficient as the “explain” aspect of such systems is
equally if not more important than the other (Shrives &
Brennan, 2017). The existence of inconclusive evidence
in this area, in general, and existence of limited evidence
on the explain element of the governance codes in partic-
ular, call for further investigations.
Considering all of the above arguments, this study
contributes to this line of literature and examines the
relationship between the quality of explanations provided
by companies when they choose non-compliance and the
market valuation of firms across two different corporate
governance systems, namely, the UK and Germany. As
suggested by Van Essen, Engelen, and Carney (2013),
corporate governance is a context-specific issue, and as a
result, the impact of corporate governance mechanisms
could be different in different countries. In terms of the
legal and financial systems, corporate governance regula-
tions, institutional settings, and capital market regula-
tions, there are substantial differences between Germany
and the UK. However, the corporate governance systems
in the two countries are based on the “comply or explain”
principle. Therefore, there may be different implications
of firm-level corporate governance mechanisms on the
market value of firms in the two countries. In line with
this, this study investigates whether or not the relation-
ship between the quality of explanations and firms' mar-
ket value is different in UK and Germany. In other
words, the study sheds light on how corporate gover-
nance disclosures are perceived by stakeholders in the
two governance systems which are based on the same
principle of “comply or explain” but have some key insti-
tutional differences.
This paper therefore makes significant contributions
to the existing corporate governance literature. Unlike
previous index-based studies which only cover the com-
pliance aspect, we develop a “comply or explain” index,
that takes into account the level of compliance as well as
the quality of reported explanations for non-compliance
with the prescribed corporate governance codes. We
argue that focusing only on the compliance aspect of a
“comply or explain” principle would undermine the sec-
ond important pillar of a “comply or explain” system of
corporate governance – the explanations reported for
non-compliance with corporate governance codes. A
recent version of the UK Corporate Governance Code
(2018) requires each listed company to justify and
explain clearly the reasons for non-compliance in case a
company has implemented alternative governance
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practices, other than those prescribed in the Code. The
Code states:
“Explanations should set out the background,
provide a clear rationale for the action the
company is taking, and explain the impact
that the action has had. Where a departure
from a Provision is intended to be limited in
time, the explanation should indicate when
the company expects to conform to the Provi-
sion. Explanations are a positive opportunity
to communicate, not an onerous obligation”.
(Financial Reporting Council, 2018, p. 2).
This clearly highlights the importance attached to expla-
nations by the regulator in case of non-compliance. The
current study, therefore, focuses on the quality of expla-
nations provided by companies and its association with
the market valuation of firms. Using a sample of 120 firms
from the UK and Germany for the period 2007–2011, the
results of this study reveal that compliance or providing
good quality explanations is positively associated with
the market value (Tobin's Q) of firms in the UK and Ger-
many. In terms of individual governance mechanisms,
board independence is positively associated with the mar-
ket valuation of German firms, while this relationship is
significantly negative for the UK firms. We find that non-
institutional blockholders' ownership has a positive
impact on the performance of German firms. However,
institutional blockholders' ownership is negatively associ-
ated with the market valuation of firms in both countries,
which raises questions about the monitoring role of insti-
tutional shareholders in both countries. This finding con-
tradicts the assumptions of Shleifer and Vishny (1986),
who argue that blockholders exercise significant influ-
ence over their investee companies. It is therefore argued
that institutional investors invest in a number of compa-
nies and hence they may not be effectively monitoring
their investee companies as compared to non-
institutional investors, whose investment is highly con-
centrated in a few firms.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 provides justifications for choosing the UK-
German context. Section 3 presents a review of the rele-
vant literature and develops the research hypotheses.
Section 4 contains discussions on the research methodol-
ogy, data and econometric specification of the models.
Section 5 discusses the results of our empirical analyses.
Section 6 concludes the paper by presenting a short sum-
mary of the overall contributions and pinpoints the
potential implications. The final section also contains a
brief note on the research limitations and specifies ave-
nues for future research.
2 | WHY THE UNITED KINGDOM
AND GERMANY?
The publication of the Cadbury Report (1992) in the UK
could be considered as the basis for various corporate
governance reforms around the world over the last three
decades. Unlike the USA and the UK, where corporate
laws and governance codes included significant protec-
tion for investors, German regulators and policy makers
seemed less concerned about the protection of share-
holders until the late 1990s (Cromme, 2005). However,
German companies listed on foreign stock exchanges
were required to fulfil the listing requirements in over-
seas markets (Baums, 2003). In response to the growing
local and international pressures calling for additional
corporate governance reforms, the first German Corpo-
rate Governance Code was published in February 2002,
exactly a decade after the publication of The Cadbury
Report. In addition, there are several key differences
between the UK and Germany.
The first key difference between the UK and Ger-
many relates to the purpose of the corporate governance
codes in these countries. In the UK the purpose of the
Governance Code is explained by the regulator as “Good
corporate governance should contribute to better company
performance by helping a board discharge its duties in the
best interests of shareholders; if it is ignored, the conse-
quence may well be vulnerability or poor performance.
Good governance should facilitate efficient, effective and
entrepreneurial management that can deliver shareholder
value over the longer term” (Financial Reporting Council,
2008, p.1).1 German corporate governance code on the
other hand, explains the purpose of the code as “…to pro-
mote the trust of international and national investors,
customers, employees and the general public in the man-
agement and supervision of listed German stock corpora-
tions” (The German Corporate Governance Code, 2008,
p.1).2 These quotations from the two governance codes
indicate that in the UK the focus is on protecting the
interests of shareholders while in Germany the code
focuses on protecting the interests of a wide range of
stakeholders. Similarly, there are also differences in
terms of legal systems, capital markets, ownership struc-
tures, code formation and developments (Kaufmann &
Valderrama, 2008; Seidl, Sanderson, & Roberts, 2013).
In terms of similarities between the UK and
Germany, the codes of corporate governance in both
countries are based on a “comply or explain” principle.
This means that listed companies are required to
report if they have complied with the recommended
corporate governance provisions and in the case of non-
compliance, they are required to provide explanations.
The empirical debate about the effectiveness of a unitary
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board system in the UK versus a two-tier board system in
Germany (Davies, 2000), and the effectiveness of a common
law system versus a civil law system (La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998) provides us with an
opportunity to examine the effectiveness of corporate
governance regulations in a cross–country setting.
A comparative study could therefore better explain
the differences of and implications for national corporate
governance regulations. Prior studies have examined the
governance-performance relationship in the context of
the UK (Dahya, McConnell, & Travlos, 2002; Weir &
Laing, 2000; Weir, Laing, & McKnight, 2002), USA
(Brown & Caylor, 2006; Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003),
Germany (Drobetz, Schillhofer, & Zimmermann, 2004;
Goncharov, Werner, & Zimmermann, 2006), Europe
(Bauer et al., 2004), and emerging markets (Durnev &
Kim, 2005; Klapper & Love, 2004). However, considering
the inconclusive international evidence in this area, we
contribute to the existing international corporate gover-
nance literature in a cross-country setting in the context
of the UK and Germany. The next section covers an over-
view of the existing literature and develops the research
hypotheses on the association between internal corporate
governance mechanisms and market valuation of firms.
3 | LITERATURE REVIEW AND
DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES
3.1 | Developing the theoretical
framework
In the existing literature, the relationship between corpo-
rate governance and various firm level outcomes is
explained with several theoretical perspectives. For
instance, agency, stakeholder, stewardship and resource
dependence theories have been used extensively to inves-
tigate how firm level governance mechanisms affect per-
formance. In this regard, Kumar and Zattoni (2015)
recommend the use of multiple theoretical perspectives,
particularly when investigating governance issues in dif-
ferent corporate governance systems. Agency theory
focuses on issues arising from the separation of owner-
ship and control in publicly listed companies (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976). The main argument is that the agency
costs arising from the separation of ownership and con-
trol cannot be dealt with only through contracts
(Hart, 1995).
As managers have control over the free cash flows of
a firm, corporate governance mechanisms are needed to
monitor managers so that they are not risk-averse and
self-serving, to make them accountable and to make
sure that the free cash flows are either returned to
shareholders, or re-invested for the long-term success of
the organisation (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The
increased monitoring and accountability brought about
by strong governance mechanisms, it is assumed, will
lead to the efficient use of resources and will be trans-
lated into improved profitability and long-term success
(Jensen, 1986). The agency theory also assumes that
strong internal corporate governance mechanisms will
lead to a decrease in agency costs, that could result in
lower premiums being charged by the providers of
finance, and a lower cost of capital for the firm (Drobetz
et al., 2004).
Existing literature that adopts agency theory, pro-
poses a positive association between better alignment of
managerial incentives and shareholders' interests
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).
Given its perceived importance for monitoring and
protecting the interests of shareholders, researchers have
extensively examined how the composition of board of
directors (see for example, Adams, Hermalin, &
Weisbach, 2010; Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003), board
committees and structures (Klein, 1998; Liao, Luo, &
Tang, 2015), and compliance with a prescribed code of
corporate governance (for a review see, Bozec & Bozec,
2012) affect corporate performance.
From the perspective of stakeholder theory compa-
nies are not only responsible to their shareholders but
also to meet the needs of their various stakeholders such
as, customers, employees, general public including non-
governmental organizations, government and local com-
munity (Freeman, 1984; Freeman, Wicks, & Parmar,
2004). Therefore, from this theoretical perspective corpo-
rate governance mechanisms are needed to protect the
interest of a wide group of stakeholders. This is in con-
trast to the narrow focus on shareholders adopted in
agency theory. The managerial and ethical branches of
stakeholder theory provide alternative explanations for
the responsibilities of management and the information
that will be disclosed by companies. The managerial
branch of stakeholder theory postulates that corporate
governance mechanisms and reporting are driven by the
needs of the most powerful stakeholder of an organisa-
tion (Deegan, 2002). Therefore, if the most powerful
stakeholder demands certain governance mechanisms or
information, managers are more likely to implement
those mechanisms and provide such information.
However, the ethical branch explains that from an ethical
perspective, corporate governance mechanisms and
reporting by firms would aim to satisfy the needs of all
their stakeholders and companies behave in this way out
of necessity to treat everyone fairly (Deegan, 2002).
As mentioned earlier, the UK Corporate Governance
Code is developed with a view to protect the interests of
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shareholders while the German Corporate Governance
Code focuses on the needs of multiple stakeholders.
Therefore, agency theory may be more appropriate in the
UK context while Stakeholder theory provides a better
theoretical lens for Germany. However, agency theory is
also applicable in the context of Germany but the nature
of agency problems might be different. For instance,
Faccio and Lang (2002) provide evidence that in Ger-
many only 10% firms are widely held while in the UK the
figure is 63%. Similarly, the authors also document that
in Germany family ownership is 64% while in the UK it
is only 23%. These ownership patterns have been shown
to give rise to different types of agency problems between
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders
(Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010; Claessens, Djankov, &
Lang, 2000). It is therefore argued that agency and stake-
holder theories are providing the appropriate frameworks
to analyse the relationship between explanations pro-
vided by firms and performance in the context of this
study.
3.2 | Compliance with corporate
governance codes and firm performance
As discussed above, theoretically strong corporate gover-
nance mechanisms will be associated with good firm perfor-
mance. In this regard, governance prescriptions provided in
corporate governance codes are considered as proxies for
strong corporate governance mechanisms. Most prior stud-
ies in this area have therefore largely focused on the level of
compliance with corporate governance codes by either
developing a corporate governance index for each firm
(e.g., Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, & Zimmermann, 2006;
Hooghiemstra, 2012) or by using commercially available
corporate governance indices (Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, &
Williamson, 2010; Bauer et al., 2004; Bauwhede &
Willekens, 2008; Gompers et al., 2003; Klapper &
Love, 2004). However, existing evidence on the relationship
between a firm's compliance with corporate governance
codes and performance is mixed. Studies havereported three
types of findings: (i) a positive relationship (Ammann,
Oesch, & Schmid, 2011; Chhaochharia & Laeven, 2009;
Klapper & Love, 2004; Dharmapala & Khanna, 2013)); (ii) a
negative relationship (Bauer et al., 2004); or (iii) no relation-
ship (Schultz et al., 2010; Wintoki et al., 2012).
There are different explanations in the existing
literature about the mixed findings. For instance,
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) argue that the impact
of compliance/non-compliance may not be uniform, and
that it depends on the size of the firm. For a sample of
US listed companies, the authors document that large
firms that are non-compliant earn positive abnormal
returns but small firms that are non-compliant earn neg-
ative abnormal returns. This points in the direction that
perhaps investors take into account a multitude of factors
when using compliance or non-compliance related dis-
closures in their decision making. Similarly, Van Essen,
Engelen, & Carney, (2013) argue that the relationship
between governance and performance is context specific
hence studies conducted in different contexts will report
different results. Other studies argue that the mixed
results may be attributed to the use of methods that fail
to control for endogeneity and related issues (see for
example, Wintoki et al., 2012).
This study adds to this stream of literature and pro-
vides evidence on the impact of the nature of explana-
tions provided by firms in two similar yet different
contexts. It is argued that in addition to communicating
their level of compliance it is also important how non-
compliance is justified and communicated. Furthermore,
it is also argued that the compliance or non-compliance
indices in prior studies have entirely focused on one
aspect, that is, compliance with a “comply or explain”
principle. However, the explain element of a “comply or
explain” principle has largely been ignored in the existing
governance literature. The quality of governance disclo-
sure is important because full disclosure could lead to
informed decision making which will also help in
enhancing transparency in listed companies (Wu &
Bowe, 2012). In line with the index-based studies in the
governance literature (e.g., Aggarwal et al., 2010; Bauer
et al., 2004; Bauwhede & Willekens, 2008; Beiner et al.,
2006; Gompers et al., 2003; Hooghiemstra, 2012;
Klapper & Love, 2004; Liu, Padgett, & Varotto, 2017), we
develop a “comply or explain” index which captures not
only the level of compliance with corporate governance
codes but also the quality of explanations provided by
companies when they do not comply with the corporate
governance codes.
As the level of compliance has gradually improved,
the attention of regulators in the UK and rest of the
Europe has shifted to the quality of the reported explana-
tions for non-compliance with the corporate governance
codes (European Commission, 2012; Financial Reporting
Council, 2012a). The EU regulations 2009 also suggest
that the existing “comply or explain” systems need to be
strengthened, and should not be abandoned (European
Commission, 2009). It is also evident from the existing lit-
erature that only a few index-based studies has focused
on the “explain” element of the “comply or explain” prin-
ciple. In line with this Rose (2016) shows that Danish
firms which either comply or provide plausible explana-
tions for their non-compliance have higher return on
assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). Similarly,
Shrives and Brenan (2017) focus specifically on the
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explanations provided for their non-compliance by a
sample of FTSE 100 firms. They document that firms
exploit the flexibility and attempt to mislead the readers
by adopting different strategies, such as providing ambig-
uous explanations, communicating that non-compliance
is not a big issue, and justifying non-compliance by focus-
ing on the end results.
While reviewing the literature on the effectiveness of
compliance in the UK, Dedman (2002) provides evidence
suggesting that compliance enhances board oversight,
reduces earnings manipulation and is associated with
better disciplining of executives. However, MacNeil & Li
(2006) investigate a sample of FTSE 100 companies
which were persistently non-compliant with the UK cor-
porate governance code. The authors argue that share-
holders of such firms tolerate non-compliance and ignore
the nature of explanations as long as such firms are prof-
itable. Furthermore, Luo and Salterio (2014) develop a
three-point scale (index) for a sample of Canadian firms
to measure compliance and the quality of corporate
governance disclosure (in the case of non-compli-
ance). Their index assigns a value of zero for non-
compliance or non-disclosure, ‘1’ for compliance, and
‘2’ for explanations reporting alternative governance
arrangements. The index thus captures: (a) full com-
pliance; (b) non-compliance with no explanations for
non-compliance; and (c) non-compliance with reasons
for non-compliance reported by companies. They
report a significantly positive relationship between
the quality of corporate governance disclosure and the
market value of firms. More recently, Honisberg (2019),
documents that in the case of “comply or explain” gov-
ernance systems, providing explanations reduce mis-
reporting at hedge funds and leads to better internal
control and improved performance.
In order to assess the quality of explanations provided
for non-compliance, Arcot and Bruno (2011) develop a
corporate governance and disclosure index. They find
that firms which are fully compliant or, alternatively, in
the case of non-compliance, which fully explain their
deviations for non-compliance have a better operating
performance. Similarly, with application of a corporate
governance index for Dutch companies which assigns a
lower score to uninformative explanations and higher
score to firm-specific detailed explanations reported for
non-compliance, Hooghiemstra (2012) argues that firms
having concentrated ownership structures are less likely
to have disclosure related issues, and these firms there-
fore approach the disclosure related requirements
for only symbolic reasons. In line with this, the present
study focuses on Germany where concentrated owner-
ship is more common and compares it with the UK
where ownership of publicly held firms is more
widespread. Therefore, it provides us with an opportunity
to investigate how the quality of explanations provided in
these two different contexts affect firm value.
The above discussion indicates that only a few index-
based studies have focused on the disclosure aspect of the
“comply or explain” principle. Furthermore, there is no
study which has focused on the quality of explanations
provided in a cross-country context. As discussed earlier,
corporate governance systems in the UK and Germany
are both based on the principle of “comply or explain”
but the objectives of both these codes are quite different.
Similarly, there are key differences between the two
countries in terms of ownership structures and legal sys-
tems. Therefore, this study adds to the existing literature
by providing evidence whether the quality of explana-
tions provided in two different contexts affect firm value
differently. We argue that the existing “comply or
explain” principle explicitly offers firms the flexibility to
either comply or provide an explanation for their non-
compliance. Therefore, non-compliant firms are not nec-
essarily badly governed as long as non-compliance is jus-
tified and communicated to the relevant stakeholders.
Based on this, the quality of explanations provided by
firms could be considered as important and relevant
information that would affect market values of firms both
in the UK and Germany. Based on agency and stake-
holder theories, firms that appear to have implemented
mechanisms to protect the interests of their stakeholders
(potential investors and shareholders are some of the
major stakeholders) in both countries should outperform
their counterparts with weak governance mechanisms.
We therefore develop the following hypothesis:
H1: High quality corporate governance disclosure is
positively associated with the market valuation of firms in
the UK and Germany.
3.3 | Board size
The size of board of directors is another important deter-
minant of firms' governance mechanisms that affects per-
formance. In the majority of cases the board size of UK
companies varies from 7 to 17 directors (Guest, 2009,
p. 32). In contrast, German boards are relatively larger,
with board size of 15 to 30 directors (Du Plessis
et al., 2012). The larger board size in the case of Germany
is because of the two tier-board governance structure as
opposed to unitary boards in the UK. In Germany the
non-executive directors (NEDs) sit on the supervisory
board and include representatives from a number of stake-
holders such as, employees, financial institutions and gov-
ernment. In terms of the effect of board size, Lipton and
Lorsch (1992) argue that when board size increases above
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ten directors, then it creates additional costs for the organi-
sation in the form of a slow decision making process. Nei-
ther the UK nor the German corporate governance codes
recommend any specific board size for listed companies.
However, the German Codetermination Act requires that
at least one third to half of board members should be rep-
resentatives of employees on the supervisory boards of
companies having more than 500 or over 2,000 employees
respectively (Commission of the German Corporate Gover-
nance Code, 2015, p. 1). The German system of corporate
governance has also put a greater emphasis on employee
empowerment, which is often known as a stakeholder-
based system of corporate governance. Based on these two
contrasted perspectives on the role of board of directors,
this study uses agency theory and stakeholder theories to
investigate the impact of board size on firm valuation.
While looking at the findings of the existing literature
on board size and performance, there is again inconsis-
tent evidence on this issue. Some studies show a signifi-
cantly positive association between board size and firm
performance, which supports the assumptions of agency
theory that larger boards enhance monitoring and
accountability. In addition to this, resource dependence
theory also predicts that larger boards provide a link
between the organisation and its external environment
(see for example, Beiner et al., 2006; Kiel &
Nicholson, 2003). However, larger boards have been
shown to be associated with increased agency costs in the
existing literature. For instance, examining the impact of
board size on the performance of 450 firms across three
countries from market-based systems (UK, USA, and
Canada) and seven countries from the relationship-based
system (Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, The
Netherlands, and Switzerland), De Andres, Azofra, and
Lopez (2005) show a significantly negative relationship
between larger board size and firm performance across
the two different corporate governance systems. Simi-
larly, using a large sample of 2,746 UK companies,
Guest (2009) finds a negative relationship between board
size and the market value of firms and shows consistent
results with the earlier findings of Yermack (1996). More
recently, Yamori, Harimaya, and Tomimura (2017) docu-
ment that in cooperative banks, board size is negatively
associated with efficiency. Based on the above discussions
we develop and test the following research hypothesis:
H2: There is a negative relationship between board size
and the market valuation of firms in UK and Germany.
3.4 | Board independence
In the context of corporate governance literature, board
independence has been regarded as a key internal
governance mechanism for firms. The appointment of
independent non-executive directors on boards has there-
fore been widely acknowledged in different corporate
governance codes around the world. Initially, the
Cadbury Report (1992) called for the appointment of at
least three independent NEDs on corporate boards. Over
the last few decades, the proportion of independent
NEDs on corporate boards has increased to at least half
of the board size for large and at least two for small UK
companies (The UK Corporate Governance Code, 2016).
In Germany, firms with more than 500 and 2000
employees are legally required to appoint one third to
one half of their employees' representatives to the super-
visory boards, whereas the remaining members are
appointed by the shareholders. The supervisory board,
which comprises NEDs, is exclusively responsible for
monitoring and advising the management board
(Davies, 2000). Section B3.3. of the UK Corporate Gover-
nance Code (2016) imposes regulatory restrictions on
executive directors and requires that “the board should
not agree to a full time executive director taking on more
than one non-executive directorship in a FTSE 100 com-
pany nor the chairmanship of such a company”. Section
5.4.5 of the German Corporate Governance Code (2015)
stipulates that “members of the management board of a
listed company shall not accept more than a total of three
supervisory board mandates in non-group listed companies
or in supervisory bodies of non-group companies which
make similar requirements”. It is thus evident that
detailed coverage on the presence of NEDs in the gover-
nance codes of UK and Germany specify the importance
given to the presence of NEDs on boards for firms' opera-
tions and performance in both countries.
There is evidence in the existing literature which doc-
uments a positive relationship between the presence of a
larger proportion of independent NEDs on boards and
the financial performance of firms (e.g., Aggarwal
et al., 2010; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Similarly, Li, Lu,
Mittoo, and Zhang (2015) show a positive relationship
between board independence and performance of Chi-
nese listed companies, and pinpoint the importance of
board independence in firms with concentrated owner-
ship structure. For a cross country sample, Hu, Li,
Taboada, and Zhang (2020) document that board reforms
that improve monitoring and the oversight of manage-
ment reduce crash risk significantly. From an agency the-
ory perspective, it is expected that the proportion of
NEDs would signal improved monitoring and therefore
will be positively associated with the financial perfor-
mance of companies. In the context of Germany, a higher
proportion of NEDs would signal that such boards are
better equipped to protect the interest of a wide range of
stakeholders. Thus, in line with the recommendations of
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corporate governance codes in the UK and Germany, and
based on the assumptions of agency and stakeholder the-
ories, the following research hypothesis is formed:
H3: Existence of independent non-executive directors on
boards is positively associated with the market valuation of
UK and German companies.
3.5 | Number of board meetings
Another key element of an effective corporate board struc-
ture that may enhance the performance of firms is related
to board meetings (measured by the total number of board
meetings during the year). In relation to board meetings,
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argue that time spent on board
meetings could be regarded as a resource provided to the
organisation, and increasing board activities enhances the
monitoring and control function exercised by the board of
directors. In line with this, Vafeas (1999) emphasises that
firms can improve their internal control mechanisms by
increasing their board activities (e.g., frequency of board
meetings). In the context of the 2007 financial crisis, Brick
and Chidambaran (2010) have reported a positive relation-
ship between board meetings and firm performance. They
argue that external market pressures from investors and
regulators may significantly influence a firm's management
to increase its board activities, which positively influences
firms' performance. Similarly, in relation to financial insti-
tutions, Salim, Arjomandi, and Seufert (2016) document a
positive relationship between board meetings and the per-
formance of Australian banks. Although use of the number
of board meetings is only a proxy indicator of board activi-
ties and may appear as a rather simplistic representation of a
board's activities, however, its main advantage is that this
information is accessible and comparable. Thus, consistent
with prior research of Brick and Chidambaran (2010), and
bearing in mind the recommendations of the UK Corporate
Governance Code (2016) and the German Corporate Gover-
nance Code (2015) we develop the following research
hypothesis:
H4: There is a positive relationship between board activ-
ity and the market valuation of UK and German
companies.
3.6 | Gearing
The presence of a higher debt to equity proportion (gear-
ing) in the statement of financial position is another
important control mechanism that can restrain managers
from diverting free cash flows to low-return projects. In
this regard, Jensen (1986) argues that managers are likely to
invest free cash flows in low-return projects instead of
distributing it to the shareholders, and gearing can be used
as an alternative corporate governance mechanism for con-
trolling such activities. A firm's debt financing provides a
signal to the market that its managers will be monitored by
the creditors and that managers will be willing to distribute
free cash flows to the shareholders (Beiner et al., 2006).
In the context of Germany, where banks play a signifi-
cant role in their corporate governance structure, Agarwal &
Elston (2001, p. 226) argue that “[b]ank-influenced firms
should enjoy increased access to capital through easier access
to bank debt or preferential terms on loans. In addition, bank
involvement with a firm serves as a signal to outside investors
and causes a certification effect, which makes it easier for firms
to attract additional equity”. The huge role played by the Ger-
man financial institutions consequently put Germany at the
forefront of “bank-based” systems of corporate governance
(Luintel, Khan, Leon-Gonzalez, & Li, 2016). However,
empirical evidence on the relationship between gearing and
firm performance is inconclusive. Some studies show a nega-
tive relationship between gearing and firm performance and
confirm the presence of a conflict of interests between share-
holders and creditors in highly geared companies (see for
example, Agarwal & Elston, 2001; Bauwhede, 2009; Francis,
Hasan, & Wu, 2012). Other studies report a positive relation-
ship between debt financing and firm performance and show
that debt holders require additional internal control mecha-
nisms (through debt agreements) beyond those implemented
by the firm (see for example, Beiner et al., 2006;
Goncharov et al., 2006). In the context of the UK,
McKnight and Weir (2009) document a positive relation-
ship between debt financing and firms' performance.
Therefore, based on the free cash flow hypothesis of
Jensen (1986), and consistent with prior empirical research
(Beiner et al., 2006; Goncharov et al., 2006; Gorton &
Schmid, 2000), we develop the following hypothesis:
H5: There is a positive relationship between gearing
and the market valuation of UK and German companies.
3.7 | External blockholders
The presence of external blockholders in the ownership
structure exert a significant influence on the corporate
governance practices of firms. In this regard, Shleifer and
Vishny (1986) argue that, although concentrated owner-
ship structure can partly mitigate the free-rider issues in
large organisations, it may also expropriate the rights of
minority shareholders. While some studies show a positive
impact of institutional blockholders' ownership on firm per-
formance (Gorton & Schmid, 2000; Lehmann & Weigand,
2000), other studies report a positive relationship between
non-institutional blockholders' ownership and the perfor-
mance of firms (see for example, Andres, 2008). It is therefore
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evident that existing governance literature on the relationship
between institutional and non-institutional blockholder own-
ership and firm performance providesmixed evidence.
On the effectiveness of ownership concentration on firm
performance, several studies have been specifically carried out
in the context of major corporate governance systems, such as
the UK (e.g., Leech & Leahy, 1991; Short & Keasey, 1999), the
USA (e.g., Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996), Germany
(e.g., Andres, 2008; Gorton & Schmid, 2000; Lehmann &
Weigand, 2000), Singapore (e.g., Nguyen, Locke, &
Reddy, 2015) and Japan (Yamuri, Harimaya & Tomimura,
2017). Other empirical studies have examined the impact of
external blockholders in two contrasting corporate governance
systems that is, Anglo-Saxon vs relationship-based systems
(e.g., Franks&Mayer, 1997; Gugler,Mueller, &Yurtoglu, 2008;
Thomsen, Pedersen, & Kvist, 2006). Most of these studies have
reported a positive association between external blockholdings
and firm performance (e.g., Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996;
Andres, 2008; Gorton & Schmid, 2000; Leech & Leahy, 1991;
Shleifer & Vishny, 1986, amongst others). Therefore, following
the theoretical propositions of Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and
consistent with prior published research carried out in the UK,
Germany and other countries, we develop the following
researchhypothesis:
H6: There is a positive relationship between blockholders'
ownership and the market valuation of UK and German
companies.
Figure 1 below presents a conceptual framework of
this research, where the main differences between the
two jurisdictions are clearly highlighted.
4 | RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
AND DATA
4.1 | Econometric specifications –
generalised method of moments
model (GMM)
Recent research has raised serious concerns about the econo-
metric techniques applied in prior corporate governance stud-
ies (see for example, Abdallah, Goergen, & O'Sullivan, 2015;
Schultz et al., 2010; Ullah, Akhtar, & Zaefarian, 2018;
Wintoki et al., 2012). The governance-performance
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• Board size 
• Board structure 
• Number of board meetings 
• Gearing 
• Institutional blockholders 
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FIGURE 1 Conceptual framework [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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research has either used an ordinary least squares regres-
sion (see for example, Gompers et al., 2003; Klapper &
Love, 2004) or a fixed-effects model (see for example,
Ammann et al., 2011; Chhaochharia & Laeven, 2009;
Yermack, 1996). However, the findings reported in these
studies should be “interpreted with caution” because the
econometric models used in these studies fail to control
for different kinds of endogeneity – a situation when the
causality may run from performance to governance
(Schultz et al., 2010, p. 146).
In line with the above arguments, Wintoki et al.
(2012) identify three sources of endogeneity, namely:
(a) unobserved heterogeneity; (b) simultaneity or reverse
causation; and (c) dynamic endogeneity. Unobserved het-
erogeneity arises when the relationship between gover-
nance and performance is affected by unobservable
factors (for instance, firm-specific characteristics). Simul-
taneity or reverse causation arises when governance and
performance affect each other simultaneously. For
instance, compliance with a corporate governance code
may enhance a firm's performance and valuation, but it
is also possible that firms with a higher market valuation
may choose strong corporate governance mechanisms
(Durnev & Kim, 2005). Moreover, dynamic endogeneity
arises when a firm's past/current performance affects the
current/future governance structure of a firm (Wintoki
et al., 2012, p. 582). For example, poor corporate perfor-
mance may cause changes in the governance structure
(e.g., removal of one or more directors from the board by
shareholders) of a firm.
While conducting this investigation, this study con-
siders all the above mentioned econometric issues and by
following Schultz et al. (2010) and Wintoki et al. (2012),
the following dynamic generalised method of moments
(GMM) model estimation is proposed:
Pit = ∂Pi,t−1 +Gβit + Xnit + μit + εit ð1Þ
In Equation 1, Pit stands for firm valuation; Pi, t − 1 is
a one period lag operator (previous year performance);
Gβit represents corporate governance variables; Xnit rep-
resents control variables; μit is firm-specific fixed effects;
and εit represents the error term. Table 1 provides defi-
nitions of variables. Our main explanatory variable is
the “comply or explain” index. Consistent with Arcot
and Bruno (2011) and Hooghiemstra (2012), we devel-
oped a corporate governance index, which assigns a
lower score to uninformative explanations reported by
non-compliant firms and vice versa. The index assigns a
highest score of 5 to a firm fully compliant with all pro-
visions of the UK and German Governance Codes. Each
non-compliant firm in the sample receives a score from
1 to 5 for each category of explanation reported for non-
compliance, and the score considers the relative infor-
mativeness of each category of explanation. For
instance, a lower score of 1 is assigned when a firm
reports “no explanation” for non-compliance; a score of
2 when a firm provides “generic” or “standard explana-
tions” or assurance of future compliance; a score of 3 for
an explanation offering alternative corporate
TABLE 1 Definition of variables
“Comply or explain” index
An index which assigns a value of 1 to 5 to each firm and takes into account a firm’s
compliance, non-compliance and the explanations reported for non-compliance with
the corporate governance codes.
Board size The total number of directors serving on the board at the end of the year.
Board independence The ratio of NEDs to total board members at the time of reporting.
Number of board meetings The total number of board meetings during a year.
Gearing The ratio of a firm's total debt to the book value of its total assets.
Institutional blockholders (%) The percentage of equity (5% and above) owned by financial institutions, insurance companies,
pension funds and unit trusts.
Non-institutional blockholders (%) The percentage of equity (5% and above) owned by all other external shareholders (excluding
institutional shareholders).
Firm size The natural logarithm of the book value of a firm's assets.
Firm-specific risk (beta) A measure of firm's riskiness. The beta factor is derived by performing a least squares
regression between adjusted prices of the stock and the corresponding Datastream market
index (values taken from Datastream).
Foreign listing A dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm is cross-listed and zero otherwise.
R&D expenditure Research and development expenditure divided by sales.
Tobin's Q Total assets + market value of equity – Total common equity – Deferred taxes/Total assets.
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governance mechanisms; a score of 4 for partial non-
compliance over a temporary period of time; and a score
of 5 for high quality detailed and firm-specific
explanation.
While examining the differences between compliant
and non-compliant UK companies, Arcot and Bruno (2011,
p. 12) noted that: “..there should be no difference between a
compliant company and a non-compliant company that
deviates from standards for good and valid reasons that are
fully disclosed”. In fact, ignoring any aspect of the “comply
or explain” principle would result in inaccurate generalisa-
tion about the effectiveness of the “comply or explain”
principle. Similarly, in relation to compliance and non-
compliance in Dutch firms, Hooghiemstra (2012), argues
that firms with concentrated ownership structures are less
likely to have disclosure related issues, and that such firms
only implement the disclosure requirements for symbolic
reasons only. Therefore, consistent with the existing litera-
ture (see for example, Hooghiemstra, 2012), we use the fol-
lowing approach to develop the index:
The “comply or explain” index = 1(no explanations)
+ 2(generic or standard explanations + assurance of
future compliance) + 3(description of alternative
practice) + 4(partial non-compliance) + 5(firm-specific
detailed explanations)/Total number of explanations
reported by a firm.
Through the application of content analysis approach
we examined 600 corporate governance reports for a sam-
ple of 120 UK and German companies, over the period
between 2007 and 2011.3
Content analysis is widely used in the accounting
and finance literature to measure the quality of corpo-
rate governance disclosures (see for example, Beck,
Campbell, & Shrives, 2010). Analysing 600 sample
reports for 120 firms in two countries, between
2007–2011, we identified instances of compliance/non-
compliance in the corporate governance reports and
developed a “comply or explain” index for each firm. A
higher score on the “comply or explain” index shows a
higher level of compliance with the respective corporate
governance codes as well as a higher quality of corpo-
rate governance disclosure (in terms of the quality of
reported explanations). We explain our index construc-
tion procedures for a hypothetical company. For
instance, if company A is non-compliant with three pro-
visions of the corporate governance code but provides
‘no explanation’ for each deviation, the “comply or
explain” index will be:
Comply or explain index = 1 3ð Þ+2 0ð Þ+3 0ð Þ+4 0ð Þ+5 0ð Þ½ =3= 1
In order to operationalise the development of “Com-
ply or explain” index, the first author manually read a
sample of 600 corporate governance reports for 120 com-
panies from both countries. Corporate governance codes
in both countries have different requirements, and differ-
ent numbers of provisions, and this was also one of the
reasons for doing a separate regression analysis in subse-
quent section. The 2006 version of the governance code
in the UK has a total number of 50 provisions while the
German Corporate Governance Code of 2006 has a total
number of 71 requirements. As the number of provisions
are different, it is expected that the level of compliance
will be different and therefore a simple compliance/non-
compliance index will be not be useful for comparability
reasons. Instead we use the weighted average index
developed by Hooghiemstra (2012). Several steps were
used to develop the “Comply or explain” weighted aver-
age index. First, each corporate governance report was
carefully read to determine whether a company is fully
compliant or there are instances of compliance. In the
second step, information was collected about the number
of provisions with which the company has reported non-
compliance. The corporate governance codes in both
countries require explanations in response to non-com-
pliance. The denominator in our “Comply or explain”
index includes the total number of explanations reported
by a non-compliant company. The next step was to look
individually into those explanations reported in response
to non-compliance and categorise them based on the
degree of informative of those explanations. In Table 2
below we develop a taxonomy of those explanations
based on their degree of informativeness. An uni-
nformative explanation in response to non-compliance
gets a lower score and an informative explanation
receives a higher score on the “Comply or explain” index.
It is possible that one company has several instances of
non-compliance and different types of explanations are
reported for each instance of non-compliance. In the
above example, a company has reported a total number
of three explanations and all those three explanations are
classified as ‘no explanations for non-compliance (see
Table 2 below for definitions of each category in our
“comply or explain” index). The coding scheme for each
category in Table 2 is developed in line with the prior
research [see for example, Hooghiemstra, 2012).
We also include control variables such as firm size,
foreign listing, firm-specific risk, and research and
development expenditure (R&D). We use the natural
logarithm of the book value of a firm’s assets to proxy
for firm size (Aggarwal et al., 2010; Chhaochharia &
Laeven, 2009; Sarhan, Ntim, & Al-Najjar, 2019). We also
control for a firm's foreign listing. In line with prior
research (e.g., Beiner et al., 2006; Schultz et al., 2010),
we use firm-specific beta as a proxy for firm-specific
risk. R&D has been reported by the majority of
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companies in the UK and Germany. The inclusion of
R&D expenditure is captures a firm's growth opportuni-
ties. Consistent with the governance-performance
research (e.g., Aggarwal et al., 2010; Ammann
et al., 2011; Bauer et al., 2004; Beiner et al., 2006;
Chhaochharia & Laeven, 2009; Gompers et al., 2003;
Klapper & Love, 2004; Yermack, 1996), we use Tobin's
Q as a proxy for a firm's market valuation. Tobin's Q is
calculated using the following formula:
(Total assets + Market value of equity – Total
common equity – Deferred taxes)/Total
assets.
The choice of our Tobin's Q measure is consistent with
the well-established governance-performance work of
Aggarwal et al. (2010), Gompers et al. (2003), Bhagat and
Bolton (2008), Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009). There
is no doubt that there are more “sophisticated”
approaches used in prior research to calculate Tobin's
Q. However, owing to the cross-country nature of our
dataset we applied a more simplistic, and representative
measure of the market valuation, for which the data was
available for most of the sample companies in both coun-
tries. The above Tobin's Q measure exclude deferred taxes
which resulted in a more refined and accurate measure
of a firm valuation. As deferred taxes are taken out it has
further diluted the values in the numerator, and as a
result we have generally lower Tobin's Q values for most
of our sample companies.
4.2 | Data and sample
The data sample (see Tables 3 and 4) includes 60 non-
financial firms from MDAX 50 and DAX 30 in Germany
for the period ending 2007–2011. MDAX 50 and DAX 30
are the indices for the largest 80 companies in Germany.
For the purpose of comparability, 60 non-financial firms
in the UK were selected based on their size and industrial
classification of their corresponding German counter-
parts. In line with other studies in the area, financial
firms and utilities are excluded from our sample as they
have to comply with additional regulatory requirements
which may affect their performance.
Owing to the lack of availability of governance data
for small-sized German companies, the scope of the sam-
ple is limited to only large companies. The compliance
statements of small size German companies are (a) not
available, and (b) if they are available, they are in
TABLE 2 Definition of various categories of explanations used in the “comply or explain” index
Categories of explanations Description Score
a. No explanations for non-
compliance
When a firm reports no explanation for non-compliance in the corporate
governance report.
1
b. Generic or standard explanations When a firm explains non-compliance by applying standard phrases,
such as “in the best interest of the company”…. “in our opinion”…. “we
believe that”…. And so on. There is an explanation, compared to no
explanation, in this category
2
c. Future assurance of compliance When a firm explains that it will implement a Code provision in the
following year or in the near future (subsequent years).
2
d. Description of alternative practices When a firm is non-compliant with a Code provision but presents
alternative corporate governance arrangements implemented by the
firm.
3
e. Partial non-compliance When a firm is non-compliant over a particular period of time during the
reporting period or it fails to implement all aspects of a specific Code
provision.
4
f. Firm-specific or context specific
detailed explanations
When a firm provides detailed explanations and justifications for non-
compliance by referring to its specific context, such as: (a) company
size; (b) board size; (c) company structure; (d) company foreign-listings
or its international operations; (e) industry or market related specific
explanations; (f) implementation issues or ineffectiveness of Code
provision; and (g) Code conflicts with laws.
5
g. Total number of explanations
reported by a firm
The total number of explanations reported by a firm, in response to non-
compliance with different provisions of the Code. This measure is used
in the denominator in our “comply or explain” index.
Note: The above taxonomy is developed based on the prior work of Hooghiemstra (2012).
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German, and hence it was not possible for the research
team to translate those. Owing to the accessibility and
readability issues relating to the compliance statements
for German companies, we only focused on medium size
(MDAX) and large size (DAX30) German companies as
these annual reports, compliance statements and corpo-
rate communication documents are available in English.
Corporate governance and financial data were extracted
from Datastream (now Thomson Eikon), whereas
blockholders' ownership data were collected from
Thomson One. All 600 corporate governance reports
were downloaded and a manual mechanistic content
analysis was carried out to develop a “comply or
explain” index. Table 5 presents a size based comparison
of our sample firms, which indicate that the “size differ-
ences” of UK and German firms in our sample are statis-
tically insignificant. Following the matching sample
criteria used in the literature (see, Peasnell, Pope, &
Young, 2001), the total assets of a comparable UK mat-
ched firm were chosen in the range of ±25% of the total
assets of a corresponding sample German firm. In
Table 5, we also used other size-based measures (num-
ber of equity shares, number of employees) when choos-
ing corresponding matching firms in the UK, and mean
values for all these relevant size based measures are
insignificant. We did not use exactly the same number
of firms from the same industry in each country because
of the unavailability of the same number of firms in the
chosen industries.
A detailed discussion on the results of our empirical
analyses is presented in the following section.
5 | EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
5.1 | Univariate analysis
Table 6 presents descriptive statistics and outcome of
the univariate analysis of this study. The “comply or
explain” index is significantly higher for the UK as
compared to the German companies, indicating a
higher level of compliance for the UK firms. In terms
of board size, the results show that German companies
have significantly larger boards where the maximum
value for the board size is recorded as 22. One reason
for a larger board size could be the two-tier board
structure, whereas another reason is the German code-
termination law, which requires that one half of the
supervisory boards of listed companies should be com-
prised of employees' representatives (Du Plessis
et al., 2012). German companies also have a signifi-
cantly higher percentage of non-executive directors on
their boards as compared to their UK counterparts
(UK = 45.703; Germany = 83.910). The UK companies
have a significantly higher number of board meetings,
with the average number of annual board meetings for
the German and UK firms being 5.923 and 8.793,
respectively. German companies have a significantly
higher gearing ratio (Germany = 0.254; UK = 0.223),
which supports the argument that German banks con-
tribute significantly to the German corporate gover-
nance system (Gorton & Schmid, 2000).
The UK companies have a significantly higher per-
centage of institutional blockholders' ownership
(UK = 14.153%; Germany = 10.130%), while German
companies have a significantly higher percentage of non-
institutional blockholders' ownership as compared to UK
firms (UK = 8.468%; Germany = 38.456%). One of the
key differences between corporate governance systems in
the UK and Germany is the ownership structure of com-
panies. The empirical literature also shows that German
companies have a highly concentrated ownership struc-
ture (Goergen, Manjon, & Renneboog, 2008), and that
non-institutional blockholders play an important role in
the German corporate governance system.
In terms of firm size and firm-specific risk we did not
find any significant differences between the UK and Ger-
man companies. In addition, the UK companies have a
significantly higher R&D expenditure as compared to
German companies (UK = 0.044; Germany = 0.023)
which pinpoint the significantly high level of innovation,
spending on new product development, and related ini-
tiatives in UK organisations as compared to their coun-
terparts. Table 7 below also shows the percentage of
shares owned by German corporations in the sample Ger-
man companies.
TABLE 3 Sample selection
Germany
DAX 30 (large) and MDAX 50 (medium)
firms for the period 2007–2011
80
Less: Financial, insurance and utilities firms (9)
Initial sample 71
Less: Firms having compliance statements in
German
(2)
Less: Firms with no compliance statements
on their websites
(9)
Final sample 60
UK
60 non-financial firms taken from FTSE 100
index based on size
60
Note: SDAX (small sized German companies) are excluded. SDAX
companies annual reports are written in German and this was one
of the reasons for a relatively small sample from Germany, which
has also affected and restricted our choice of comparative sample
from the UK.
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TABLE 4 Sample characteristics
Industrial composition Germany % UK %
Automobiles & parts 5 8.3 1 1.7
Basic resources 3 5 9 15
Chemicals 9 15 6 10
Construction & Materials 1 1.7 1 1.7
Food & Beverage 1 1.7 3 5
Health Care & Pharmaceutical 6 10 12 20
Industrial Goods & Services 17 28.3 13 21.6
Media 2 3.3 1 1.7
Oil & gas 0 0 3 5
Personal & household goods 6 10 4 6.6
Real estate 1 1.7 2 3.3
Retail 3 5 1 1.7
Technology 3 5 1 1.7
Telecommunications 1 1.7 1 1.7
Travel & Leisure 2 3.3 2 3.3
Total 60 100% 60 100%
TABLE 5 Size based sample comparison
UK Germany t-values
5 years' average book value of total assets (€m,
end of financial year)
64,856,313 105,700,908 −1.42
5 years' average number of equity shares 6,846,664 1,431,722 0.93
5 years' average total number of employees 44,794 67,228 −0.46
Number of firms 60 60
Note: The values for assets and market capitalisation are reported in a common currency (the euro). Differences in sample mean values are
reported using t-statistics. The mean differences between all firm-specific characteristics are statistically insignificant.
TABLE 6 Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis
Variables
UK Germany
Mean Std. dev. Min Max Mean Std. dev. Min Max
“Comply or explain” index 4.129*** 1.237 1.000 5.000 2.811 1.390 1.000 5.000
Board size 10.030 2.384 4.000 16.000 14.483*** 4.493 5.000 22.000
Board structure 45.703 16.104 10.500 79.860 83.910*** 3.771 45.500 88.600
Number of board meetings 8.793*** 2.526 3.000 25.000 5.923 1.723 4.000 13.000
Gearing 0.223 0.131 0.000 0.583 0.254** 0.139 0.003 0.636
Institutional blockholders (%) 14.153*** 8.011 0.000 42.530 10.130 5.222 0.000 37.010
Non-institutional blockholders (%) 8.468 9.038 0.000 77.270 38.456*** 15.446 0.000 75.120
Firm size 14.948 1.852 10.152 18.976 15.488 1.415 11.874 18.625
Firm-specific risk (beta) 1.000 0.372 0.400 1.910 0.993 0.352 0.325 1.898
R&D 0.044*** 0.065 0.000 0.350 0.023 0.022 0.000 0.121
Tobin's Q 0.511 0.238 0.012 1.658 0.610*** 0.136 0.144 0.899
Return on assets (ROA) 0.119* 0.139 −0.672 0.609 0.093 0.083 −0.063 0.604
Note: T-tests are used to compare the mean values of UK.
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Table 8 reports the average values of the “comply or
explain” index for sample industries in both countries. In
Germany, construction and materials companies have
the highest “comply or explain” index, followed by auto-
mobile and parts, while in the UK, companies in the per-
sonal and household goods, and food and beverages
industry have the highest score on our “comply or
explain” index.
In Table 9 we use a non-parametric test to compare
the median values of firms across these two countries.
We used a two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test, and the
Mann–Whitney p-values are reported in Table 9. The
results from the non-parametric test reveals significant
difference in board structures (board independence of
companies in the UK and Germany, with German com-
panies having higher percentage of NEDs in their
boardrooms).
We now discuss the outcome of our regression ana-
lyses in section 5.2 below.
5.2 | Regression analysis
As the most commonly used method of estimation, we
employ ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis
as the first technique for estimating our models. The
results of our OLS estimations are reported in Table 10.
In order to check the consistency of OLS regression
results we follow Wintoki et al. (2012), and apply the
Durbin–Wu–Hausman test for endogeneity to our
models.
As reported in Table 11, the results of the Durbin–
Wu–Hausman test turns out to be significant which
imply that the OLS estimations are inconsistent owing to
the presence of endogeneity problems.
We therefore control for minimising the impact of
endogeneity and carried out a revised analysis using the
dynamic generalised method of moments (GMM) estima-
tion. The output of our GMM estimation is reported in
Table 12.
The results in in Table 12 suggest that the “comply or
explain” index is significantly positively associated with
the Tobin's Q for the UK firms. This is consistent with
the findings of Arcot and Bruno (2011) which show a
positive association between governance compliance and
firm performance in the UK. This would mean that com-
pliance with the recommendations of the corporate gov-
ernance codes (or non-compliance when valid
justification is provided) has a positive effect on the mar-
ket valuation of firms (see for example, Beiner
et al., 2006; Gompers et al., 2003; Klapper & Love, 2004,
Honisberg, 2019). The findings also support the idea of
TABLE 7 Percentage of shares owned by German corporations in the sample German companies
Company Investor name (corporations)
Percentage of shareholdings
2011 2010 2009 2008 2007
Beiersdorf Maxingvest AG 50.46 50.46 50.46 50.46 50.46
Brenntag Brachem acquisition S.C.A. 36.02 49.61 - - -
Clesio Franz Haniel & Cie. GmbH 54.6 54.6 54.6 55.81 52.9
Continental B.Metzler seel. Sohn & co. holding AG 5.19 16.48 19.50 3.99
Fresenius medical care Fresenius SE & co KGaA 30.30 35.80 36.37 35.94 36.55
Fraport Deutsche Lufthansa AG 9.92 9.93 9.94 9.95 9.96
Fraport Land Hessen 31.48 31.50 31.57 31.59 31.62
Fraport Stadtwerke Frankfurt am Main holding GMBH 20.11 20.12 20.16 20.17 20.19
Heidelbergcement Spohn cement GmbH 25.11 25.11 24.42 79.06 78.57
Man Volkswagen AG 55.90 29.90 29.90 29.90 29.90
Aurubis Salzgitter AG 25.00 25.26 25.26 20.00 -
Prosiebensat 1 media Lavena holding 1 GmbH 18.00 25.30 25.30 25.30 13.30
Puma Kering SA 75.12 70.70 69.36 65.27 62.09
SGL carbon Voith group 9.14 5.11 5.12 - -
SGL carbon Volkswagen AG 8.18 - - - -
TUI Geveran trading company, ltd. 14.97 14.99 14.99 15.01 5.12
Volkswagen Porsche Automobil holding SE 50.73 50.74 53.11 42.60 31.00
Source: Thomson One.
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self-regulation through the applications of a ‘comply or
explain’ principle in the UK which is working well in its
existing state.
As the index captures both the level of compliance
and quality of explanations a positive relationship will
imply two things: first that compliance has a positive
impact; and second that good quality explanation means
that a firm has adopted good alternative governance
practices which the capital markets regard as an as alter-
native to governance compliance. This is consistent with
Luo and Salterio (2014) who show a positive impact of
corporate governance compliance and a disclosure index4
on the market value of Canadian firms. For German
firms, this relationship is also positive but statistically
insignificant. We therefore find only partial support for
the contention that compliance or justified in accordance
with explanation with the German Corporate Gover-
nance Code positively affect the market valuation of Ger-
man companies. These findings indicate that external
disclosure quality is more value relevant in a dispersed
ownership system, the UK. However, in the context of
Germany, the representation of employees and share-
holders on the corporate boards of German companies
bridge the information asymmetry gap between firms
and their stakeholders. This is because most of the stake-
holders will have some input in the governance mecha-
nisms of German companies. Therefore, the importance
of compliance or quality of disclosure might be perceived
as less important by various stakeholders.
The results show a significantly negative relationship
between board size and the financial performance of UK
firms. The negative relationship between board size and
Tobin's Q is in line with the results of existing literature
(Yamori et al., 2017; Guest, 2009). For the German sam-
ple, we did not find any significant impact of board size
on the market valuation of firms. The results of our uni-
variate analysis indicate that board size of German firms
is significantly larger than UK firms. However, the char-
acteristics of boards are quite different in the UK from
Germany. In the German context larger boards could sig-
nal a better representation from the key stakeholders of
TABLE 8 Mean values of the “Comply or Explain” index
across industries in the UK and Germany
Industries Germany UK
Automobiles & parts 3.124 3.996
Basic resources 2.700 3.366
Chemicals 2.006 3.169
Construction & materials 3.594 3.961
Food & beverage 2.956 4.647
Health care & pharmaceutical 3.098 4.101
Industrial goods & services 2.207 4.483
Media 2.566 4.011
Oil & gas Na^ 4.014
Personal & household goods 3.198 4.733
Real estate 2.228 4.272
Retail 3.245 3.414
Technology 2.233 4.138
Telecommunications 3.373 3.126
Travel & leisure 2.799 2.367
Note: ^indicates that there was no oil and gas firm from this indus-
try in our German sample.
TABLE 9 Non-parametric test: Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann–Whitney) test
Variables
UK Germany
Mann–Whitney p-valuesMedian Median
“Comply or explain” index 5.000 2.500 0.686
Board size 10.000 15.000 0.204
Board structure 44.880 85.210 0.003
Number of board meetings 9.000 6.000 0.846
Gearing 0.215 0.250 0.413
Institutional blockholders (%) 14.153 10.130 0.725
Non-institutional blockholders (%) 31.468 38.456 0.277
Firm size 15.075 15.391 0.412
Firm-specific risk (beta) 0.970 0.993 0.500
R&D 0.018 0.022 0.506
Tobin's Q 0.512 0.617 0.355
Return on assets (ROA) 0.104 0.075 0.626
Note: Mann–Whitney p-values are used to compare the median values of UK and German firms.
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an organisation, such as employees, banks, and share-
holders which is expected to produce a positive impact
on the valuation of companies. However, as reported by
Guest (2009), the existence of larger boards in the UK
firms could indicate more agency costs and a negative
relationship is therefore observed between board size and
firm value in UK companies.
The relationship between board independence and
Tobin's Q is shown as significantly negative. This is con-
sistent with the findings reported by Weir and
Laing (2000) for the UK firms, and Agrawal and
Knoeber (1996), and Francis et al. (2012) for US firms
Similarly, while examining the causes and impact of the
2007–2008 financial crisis the effectiveness of non-
executive directors on corporate boards has also been
recently questioned by researchers. For example, Aebi,
Sabato, and Schmid (2012) show a negative relationship
between the presence of a high percentage of NEDs on
corporate boards and the financial performance of US
firms. In a recent study, Moursli (2020) documents that
board independence negatively affects market valuation
of Swedish firms and this negative relationship can be
explained by the busyness of such directors. Interestingly,
for German firms, we find a significantly positive rela-
tionship between board independence and the market
valuation of firms. Comparing the UK and German
boards, it is evident that German board structures are
perhaps more complex with a two-tier system and a wide
range representation on boards from employees, banks
and shareholders. This positive relationship between the
percentage of NEDs on boards and the market valuation
of firms supports the assumptions of agency theory and
resource dependence theory. It also indicates that the
presence of NEDs on German firms' corporate boards
represent the key stakeholders and their role is more
effective in monitoring and advising the board of direc-
tors. This finding implies that the market may perceive
the role of non-executive directors differently in different
countries, and consequently, corporate governance
TABLE 10 Corporate governance and the market valuation of
firms (OLS results)
Model 1 Model 2
Variables UK Germany
“Comply or explain” index 0.0232** 0.00305
(0.0113) (0.00515)
Board size −0.0123 0.00816***
(0.00748) (0.00183)
Board independence −0.00168* −0.00204
(0.000881) (0.00182)
Number of board meetings 0.0115** 0.00390
(0.00535) (0.00403)
Gearing 0.370*** 0.232***
(0.107) (0.0508)
Institutional blockholders (%) −0.00343* −0.00390***
(0.00180) (0.00135)
Non-institutional blockholders (%) −0.000480 0.000146
(0.00149) (0.000466)
Firm size 0.00664 0.00745
(0.0105) (0.00612)
Firm-specific risk (beta) 0.000774 0.0924***
(0.0376) (0.0192)
Foreign listing 0.161** −0.0425***
(0.0654) (0.0154)
R&D −0.295 −0.547
(0.222) (0.346)
Constant 0.258* 0.429**
(0.149) (0.166)
Observations 297 286
R-squared 0.145 0.270
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level, respectively. Tobin's Q is the dependent variable in
models 1 and 2. Please see definition of all the variables in Table 1.
TABLE 11 Results of the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test for
Endogeneity
Variables UK Germany
“Comply or explain” index 6.04** 7.58***
Board size 2.7 19.9***
Board independence 3.66* 1.25
Number of board meetings 4.59** 0.94
Gearing 12.02*** 20.82***
Institutional blockholders (%) 3.64** 8.37***
Non-institutional blockholders (%) 0.10 0.10
Firm size 0.4 1.48
Firm-specific risk (beta) 0.50 23.06***
R&D 1.77 2.50
Foreign listing 6.04** 7.58***
Note: Definitions of variables are provided in Table 1. This table
reports Durbin–Wu–Hausman test statistics (abbreviated as DWH)
for each independent/control variable used in the OLS models
reported in Table 6 (e.g., Model 1 – Model 2). The null hypothesis
states that all regressors (corporate governance mechanisms) are
exogenous. The Durbin–Wu–Hausman test was carried out for all
independent/control variables. STATA (1999) provides guidelines
about how to carry-out a Durbin–Wu–Hausman test in STATA for
each individual variable. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 stand
for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
ULLAH ET AL. 17
mechanisms may not yield the same results in different
corporate governance systems (Van Essen et al., 2013).
This finding would question the true independence of the
corporate boards in UK firms because a truly indepen-
dent board is theoretically expected to reduce agency
costs and show a positive association with firm
performance.
We find a significantly positive relationship between
the number of board meetings and the market valuation
of both the UK and German firms. This finding is consis-
tent with Brick and Chidambaran (2010) which show a
positive relationship between the number of board meet-
ings and organisational performance. The findings indi-
cate that an increase in board activities (measured by the
number of board meetings) enhances a firm's monitoring
and control functions and is therefore regarded as signifi-
cant in firms' operations and financial performance
Moreover, our results show that gearing has a signifi-
cantly positive impact on the market valuation of the UK
and German companies. This finding is consistent with
the findings reported by Goncharov et al. (2006) for a
sample of German firms, and, McKnight and Weir (2009)
and Dahya et al. (2002) for a sample of UK firms. The sig-
nificantly positive impact of gearing on the firm market
value indicates that capital markets in both the UK and
Germany consider gearing as an important strategic fac-
tor in organisational corporate governance systems.
The results for the blockholders' ownership show that
institutional blockholders' ownership has a negative
impact on the market valuation of UK and German firms.
This is also consistent with the findings of Gugler
et al. (2008) where they compare the Anglo-Saxon and
relationship-based corporate governance systems. In the
context of the UK, Mura (2007) has also reported a signif-
icantly negative relationship between institutional
blockholders' ownership and the market valuation of UK
firms. More recently, regulators in the UK have raised
concerns over the monitoring role of the UK institutional
shareholders. In order to address this issue, the Financial
Reporting Council issued The UK Stewardship Code for
the institutional investors in 2012 (Financial Reporting
Council, 2012b). The above-mentioned negative relation-
ship between institutional blockholders' ownership and
the market valuation of firms suggests that the capital
markets in the UK and Germany do not consider institu-
tional investors as effective monitors.
Interestingly, non-institutional blockholders' owner-
ship has a significantly positive impact on the market
valuation of UK and German firms. This finding is
consistent with Lehmann and Weigand (2000) for
German firms, and Short and Keasey (1999) for the UK
sample. This outcome of this finding would imply that
non-institutional blockholders (individuals, families,
TABLE 12 Corporate governance mechanisms and market-
based measure of firm financial performance (Tobin's Q)
Model 3 Model 4
Variables UK Germany
L.Tobin's Q 0.0485*** 0.238***
(0.00910) (0.0310)
“Comply or explain” index 0.0151*** 0.0389567
(0.00490) (.03492)
Board size −0.0146*** 0.00143
(0.00308) (0.00142)
Board independence −0.00126*** 0.00119**
(0.000364) (0.000508)
Number of board meetings 0.0225*** 0.00470***
(0.00198) (0.000940)
Gearing 0.135** 0.0994***
(0.0582) (0.0363)
Institutional blockholders (%) −0.00159* −0.00448***
(0.000936) (0.000754)
Non-institutional blockholders (%) 0.00133*** 0.00136***
(0.000306) (0.000208)
Firm size 0.0264*** 0.0436***
(0.00972) (0.00836)
Firm-specific risk (beta) 0.0355** 0.0743***
(0.0166) (0.0104)
Foreign listing 0.0178 0.102***
(0.0697) (0.0186)
R&D 0.659*** 0.548***
(0.0409) (0.172)
Constant −0.0499 0.380***
(0.145) (0.119)
AR(1) test (p-values)
AR(2) test (p-values)
0.0848
0.3054
0.0021
0.3871
Sargan test of overidentification 51.48 43.13
Observations 238 230
Number of firms 60 60
Note: Table 12 shows results of two-step generalised method of
moments estimation for 60 German and UK non-financial firms (total
120 firms) over the period 2007–2011. In Model 3 and Model 4, the
dependent variable includes the market-based measure of firm perfor-
mance – Tobin's Q. L.Tobin's Q means lagged values of the dependent
variable Tobin's Q. L.Tobin's Q is included as an independent variable
in Model 3 and 4. Only one lag of the dependent variable is included
in both models. AR (1) and AR (2) are the Arellano–Bond test statistics
for first-order and second-order correlation, under the null hypothesis
of no serial auto-correlation. The Sargan test statistic is a test of over-
identifying restrictions, under the null hypothesis that all instruments
are valid. Standard errors reported in parentheses. Definitions of vari-
ables are provided in Table 1. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 stand
for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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corporations) exert a significant influence in monitoring
their investee companies. One possible explanation for
different findings for non-institutional and institutional
blockholders could be, that non-institutional investors
(families', individuals' and others') investment is highly
concentrated in a few firms, and because of their higher
investment stakes and substantial exposure to risk, they
closely monitor the performance of their investees' com-
panies. On the other hand, institutional investors would
usually hold shares in many companies so their exposure
to an individual firm would be limited which weakens
their incentive to monitor and scrutinise individual
companies. This could also indicate that institutional
investors invest others' money in these companies while
non-institutional investors invest their own money.
Therefore, the stake of non-institutional investors could
be considered much higher as compared to institutional
investors. In fact, the UK regulators have recently issued
a separate code for institutional investors in the UK
which is called the UK Stewardship Code. We therefore
argue that our findings about the negative relationship
between institutional shareholders' ownership and
market valuation of firms confirm the concerns and criti-
cism over the weak monitoring role of institutional inves-
tors highlighted in the UK Stewardship Code.
In relation to the control variables we find that firm
size has a positive association with the market valuation
of UK and German firms. This finding supports the con-
tention that larger firms have a higher market valuation
from the capital markets in both countries. Foreign
listing has a significantly positive impact on the market
valuation of German firms; however, for UK companies,
the relationship between foreign listing and the perfor-
mance of firms is statistically insignificant. Firm-specific
risk (beta) has a significantly positive impact on the mar-
ket valuation (Tobin's Q) of the UK and German firms
which is consistent with the findings reported by Beiner
et al. (2006). As expected, R&D expenditure has a signifi-
cantly positive impact on the market valuation of firms
for both the UK and Germany companies. This suggests
that investment in R&D expenditure is value-relevant
and investors are willing to pay a premium for companies
with higher spending on R&D. Moreover, our findings
are robust when we use an alternative measure for the
“comply or explain” index and an additional explanatory
variable in our analyses.
5.3 | Does the quality of CG compliance/
non-compliance explanations depend on
the CG structures?
The primary focus of this research is to understand
whether governance mechanisms, compliance, and the
quality of governance disclosure have implications for
firms' market valuation in the UK and Germany. As a
supplementary analysis, we tested the determinants of
corporate governance compliance and disclosure. In
doing so, we included the “comply or explain” index as
the explanatory variable, and firm-level corporate
TABLE 13 Ordered logistic regression: Does the quality of corporate governance compliance/non-compliance explanations depend on
the corporate governance structures?
UK Germany
Variables Coefficients p-values Coefficients p-values
Board size −0.0730302 0.289 −0.0346722 0.240
Board independence −0.0124843 0.114 0.004276 0.891
Number of board meetings 0.016351 0.753 −0.0463996 0.480
Gearing 2.599591 0.007 −0.4013295 0.616
Institutional blockholders (%) 0.0408286 0.017 −0.0009966 0.963
Non-institutional blockholders (%) 0.0080415 0.547 −0.0230061 0.002
Firm size 0.3811823 0.000 0.2794454 0.004
Firm-specific risk (beta) 0.3961351 0.270 0.2374045 0.436
Foreign listing 0.7248223 0.192 0.9983818 0.000
R&D 6.206241 0.005 4.431379 0.406
Observations 297 286
Pseudo R2 0.0537 0.0358
Note: The table reports ordered logistic regression results. The dependent variable is the “comply or explain” index, and firm-level corporate
governance mechanisms are included as explanatory variables. The coefficient for the UK and German sample are reported separately.
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governance attributes as control factors. Instead of using
traditional panel data models, we used ordered logistic
regressions for our additional analysis, and the results are
reported in Table 13. One particular reason for using this
approach is that our dependent variable “comply or
explain” index has a meaningful order. The “comply or
explain” index takes a minimum value of one and maxi-
mum value of 5 and hence ordered logistic regression
was a most suitable methodological choice for this type
of investigation. The results for UK firms indicate that
institutional blockholders and debt financing have a sig-
nificant relationship with the “comply or explain” index
which shows the monitoring role of external capital pro-
viders. As expected, firm size has a positive relationship
with the “comply or explain” index which indicates that
larger firms tend to be fully compliant or will provide
high quality disclosure, and this is in line with the tradi-
tional governance-performance research in comparative
international context (Aggarwal et al., 2010;
Chhaochharia & Laeven, 2009; Klapper & Love, 2004). In
the case of Germany, non-institutional blockholder own-
ership is negatively related with the “comply or explain”
index. In the context of Germany, firms with foreign list-
ing have a positive relationship with the “comply or
explain” index which is consistent with the notion that
foreign listed firms are subject to additional disclosure
requirements in overseas regimes and hence they are
more likely to comply with domestic regulations as over-
seas listing regulations could often be more stringent
than host country's regulations, depending on the
jurisdiction(s) where company is listed. Contrary to our
expectations, we could not find any significant relation-
ship between board attributes and the “comply or
explain” index in both countries.
5.4 | Robustness tests
Consistent with the previous studies using commercially
available ratings (such as Aggarwal et al., 2010; Bauer
et al., 2004; Gompers et al., 2003; Klapper & Love, 2004),
we also use commercially available ratings (the
Datastream Corporate Governance Score) to test whether
the results reported under the “comply or explain” index
are robust when an alternative measure of the quality of a
firm corporate governance is used (see Table 14 for
details). According to Datastream “a corporate governance
score is a number between 0 and 100 showing how the
company performs compared with the entire ASSET45
universe based on the ‘value’ in the related indicator”.
Sales growth was also included as an additional control
variable. Consistent with prior literature (see for example,
Chhaochharia & Laeven, 2009; Drobetz et al., 2004; Gom-
pers et al., 2003), sales growth is calculated as: current
year's sales minus previous year's sales divided by previous
year's sales. It is expected that there will be a positive
TABLE 14 Sensitivity analysis with the Datastream corporate
governance ratings
Model 5 Model 6
Variables UK Germany
L. Tobin's Q 0.0759*** 0.294***
(0.0141) (0.0217)
Corporate governance score 0.000684** 0.00160
(0.000286) (0.00111)
Board size −0.00657* 0.00115
(0.00398) (0.00173)
Board independence −0.000818* 0.00116**
(0.000483) (0.000541)
Number of board meetings 0.0235*** 0.00546***
(0.00341) (0.0015)
Gearing 0.149** 0.0937***
(0.0636) (0.0344)
Institutional blockholders (%) −0.00292** −0.00432***
(0.00133) (0.000785)
Non-institutional blockholders (%) 0.00142*** 0.00107***
(0.000423) (0.000211)
Firm size 0.0373*** 0.0265***
(0.0114) (0.00797)
Firm-specific risk (beta) 0.0526*** 0.0916***
(0.0189) (0.00884)
Foreign listing 0.0477 0.0345***
(0.0708) (0.00175)
R&D 0.576*** 0.565***
(0.0648) (0.123)
Sales growth 0.316*** 0.392***
(0.0676) (0.0652)
Constant −0.24 −0.14
(0.17) (0.118)
Observations 240 230
Number of firms 60 60
AR(1) test (p-values) 0.0721 0.0012
AR(2) test (p-values) 0.1703 0.3139
Sargan test 47.939 41.872
Note: This table shows results of two-step generalised method of
moments estimation for 60 German and UK non-financial firms
over the period 2007–2011. Dependent variable is the market-based
measure of firm performance Tobin's Q. L.Tobin's Q indicates
lagged values of the dependent variable Tobin's Q.
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relationship between sales growth and the performance of
firms.
Table 14 shows that our findings are robust when we
use additional control variables and an alternative mea-
sure for the quality of corporate governance. Except in
the UK sample (refer to Model 5), where the impact of
board size and board independence are now significant at
the 10% level only, as compared to the 1% significance
level reported in Table 8. In addition, sales growth is sig-
nificantly positively associated with Tobin's Q for the UK
and German companies. In addition, the post estimation
tests, including the Sargan test and the Arellano-Bond
test for auto-correlation suggest, that the instruments/
models are valid.
6 | CONCLUSION AND
IMPLICATIONS
Over the last three decades, differences in the corporate
governance systems of different countries have been
widely explored and debated in the accounting, finance,
economics and corporate governance literature. How-
ever, very little is known about the implications of these
differences for firm performance and actual corporate
governance practices in different countries. This study
examines the impact of differences in the corporate gov-
ernance regulations in UK and Germany and examines
their impact on firms' governance practices and perfor-
mance in the two countries We develop a “comply or
explain” index which not only captures the level of com-
pliance with the governance regulations but also the
quality of explanations given for non-compliance in UK
and German organisations. Using a sample of 120 Ger-
man and UK listed companies and through the applica-
tion of both the univariate and multivariate analyses, this
study contributes to the existing literature in two ways.
First it explores whether there are differences in corpo-
rate governance mechanisms of companies in the two
countries, and then examines how compliance, the qual-
ity of explanations provided in non-compliance disclo-
sures, and various other internal corporate governance
mechanisms, affect the market valuation of companies in
the UK and Germany.
The results of our univariate analysis reveal signifi-
cant differences in the corporate governance mecha-
nisms, ownership structure, and control procedures of
UK and German companies. The differences in corporate
governance mechanisms have implications for the mar-
ket valuation of firms in the two countries. For example,
the “comply or explain” index has a significantly positive
impact on the market valuation of UK firms. This would
mean that fully compliant firms and firms that have
implemented strong alternative corporate governance
mechanisms have a higher market valuation in the UK.
Our governance index captures compliance and also
assigns a higher score to non-compliant firms that have
implemented their own strong governance mechanisms
over and above those mechanisms which are prescribed
by the regulators. The “comply or explain” index is, how-
ever, insignificantly associated with the market valuation
of German firms, which indicates that investors react dif-
ferently to the non-compliance disclosure in two coun-
tries. This may indicate the cultural aspect of the user
perception in a particular jurisdiction because firms in
Germany are generally expected to comply with the given
regulation.
Our findings also highlight that the impact of board
size on market valuation is different in UK and Germany.
While a negative relationship is shown between board
size and the market valuation of UK firms, no significant
relationship of this kind is indicated by our findings for
German firms. This finding implies that similar (but not
identical) corporate governance mechanisms may have
different implications for firms in different jurisdictions.
We argue that, because of the two-tier board structure
and various stakeholder representations on corporate
boards of German firms, the negative impact associated
with larger boards is mitigated. This finding thus suggests
that the negative impact of larger corporate boards
depends on the characteristics and types of the directors
on the board and the overall board structure. It is also
evident from the findings that the board size of German
firms is significantly larger than the UK firms due to
which the characteristics of corporate boards are quite
different in the two countries. It is therefore argued that
in case of Germany larger boards could signal more rep-
resentation from the key stakeholders of an organisation,
such as employees, banks and shareholders. In contrast,
as the regulatory requirements on board size in the UK is
different, larger boards could result in more agency costs.
These findings therefore present policy implications for
the regulation about board size and structure in the UK
and other countries.
In relation to the positive impact of gearing on the
market valuation of UK and German firms, our findings
support the notion that the level of gearing in firms' capi-
tal structure serves as an important corporate governance
mechanism in both corporate governance systems. We
also find that non-institutional blockholders play a signif-
icant monitoring role in the German corporate gover-
nance system. Interestingly, and contrary to our
expectations, institutional blockholders' ownership has a
negative impact on the market valuation of firms in both
countries. In relation to this finding we argue that as
institutional investors hold shares in many companies, so
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their attention exposure to an individual firm may be lim-
ited which would reduce their incentive to monitor and
scrutinise individual companies in their portfolios. The
negative relationship between institutional blockholders'
ownership and market valuation of firms confirms the
concerns and criticism over the weak monitoring role of
institutional investors highlighted in the UK Stewardship
Code (2016). It is therefore argued that, with respect to the
role of institutional investors, our findings have policy
implications and present useful insights for governments
and regulators in different countries.
As our research focuses on the often-ignored aspect of
the “comply or explain” principle, these findings have
implications for practitioners and regulators. We argue
that both compliance and the explanations given for non-
compliance are equally important as long as companies
can offer valid reasons and justifications for the non-
compliance with the corporate governance regulations.
The findings also highlight that the “comply or explain”
principle is working well in both the UK and Germany
and that companies in both these countries could benefit
from the flexibility offered by this principle. We argue
that the mixed and inconclusive empirical evidence on
the relationship between governance and firm perfor-
mance in the existing literature would indicate that the
governance-performance relationship cannot be exam-
ined through the lens of a single and universal theory of
corporate governance. We therefore propose a multiple
theoretical perspective in this area of research and argue
that this approach could be helpful in examining the
governance-performance relationship in different corpo-
rate governance settings. In fact, investigating the com-
plex nature of the governance-performance relationship
through the application of multiple theories and multiple
methods may take us closer to developing a more com-
prehensive theory of corporate governance. Our findings
therefore support the free market perspective on corpo-
rate governance regulation and present policy implica-
tions for the introduction of “comply or explain” based
governance principles in different countries.
Despite the significant contributions that this study has
made to existing literature, we also acknowledge some of
the limitations of this research. First, despite making sub-
stantial efforts in the data collection process, we only man-
aged to collect data for 120 companies, and inferences are
therefore based on a relatively small sample in both coun-
tries. We therefore argue that the context of both the UK
and German companies, a larger sample would contribute
more to the debate on the relationship between the “comply
or explain” principle and the market valuation of UK and
German companies. Second, as the governance regulations
and compliance requirements in other European countries
are different, it would have been better to include other
major European countries, such as: France, Italy, Spain,
Netherland, Belgium, etc., in the analyses, because inclu-
sion of such countries would certainly add more insights to
our understandings and the debate on these issues. Third,
other board characteristics, such as directors' education, eth-
nic background, gender diversity, directors' time with the
company, and firm's age would certainly produce useful
insights on the relationship between the “comply or
explain” principle and the market valuation of firms in both
the UK and Germany. However, due to time and resource
constraints, coverage of all the above mentioned avenues is
out of the scope of this paper, and is therefore left to future
research.
ENDNOTES
1 https://www.frc.org.uk/getattachment/56920102-feeb-4da7-84f7-
1061840af9f0/Combined-Code-Web-Optimized-June-2008.pdf
2 https://www.dcgk.de/en/code/archive.html
3 Although the end date of the crisis is not universally agreed in
any case, Lu and Whidbee (2013) argue that the financial crisis
ended in 2011.
4 Similar to the “comply or explain” index, the index used by Luo
and Salterio (2014) also measures compliance as well as the qual-
ity of explanations reported by non-compliant firms.
5 ASSET4 AG provides investment research data on the economic,
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) aspects of its con-
stituent companies.
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